精神病学中身心交互作用的历史认识论。
Historical epistemology of the body-mind interaction in psychiatry.
作者信息
Berrios German E
机构信息
Emeritus Chair of the Epistemology of Psychiatry, Emeritus Consultant & Head of Neuropsychiatry, Life Fellow, Robinson College, University of Cambridge, UK.
出版信息
Dialogues Clin Neurosci. 2018 Mar;20(1):5-13. doi: 10.31887/DCNS.2018.20.1/gberrios.
This paper deals with the history of the relationship between the mind-body dualism and the epistemology of madness. Earlier versions of such dualism posed little problem in regard to the manner of their communication. The Cartesian view that mind and body did, in fact, name different substances introduced a problem of incommunicability that is yet to be resolved. Earlier views that madness may be related to changes in the brain began gaining empirical support during the 17th century. Writers on madness chose to resolve the mind-body problem differently Some stated that such communication was not needed; others, that mind was a redundant concept, as madness could be fully explained by structural changes in the brain; and yet others described psychological spaces for madness to inhabit as a symbolic conflict. The epistemology of the neurosciences bypasses the conundrum, as it processes all together the variables representing the brain, subjectivity, and behavior and bridges the "philosophical" gap by means of correlational structures.
本文探讨身心二元论与疯狂认识论之间关系的历史。早期版本的这种二元论在其交流方式方面几乎没有问题。笛卡尔认为心灵和身体实际上指的是不同实体的观点引入了一个尚未解决的不可交流性问题。早期认为疯狂可能与大脑变化有关的观点在17世纪开始获得实证支持。研究疯狂的作家们选择以不同方式解决身心问题。一些人表示不需要这种交流；另一些人则认为心灵是一个多余的概念，因为疯狂可以完全由大脑的结构变化来解释；还有一些人将疯狂所占据的心理空间描述为一种象征性冲突。神经科学的认识论绕过了这个难题，因为它将代表大脑、主观性和行为的所有变量一起处理，并通过相关结构弥合了“哲学”鸿沟。
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