Umeå University, SE-901 87, Umeå, Sweden.
Södertörn University - Stockholm, SE-141 89, Huddinge, Sweden.
J Health Econ. 2018 Sep;61:1-12. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.06.009. Epub 2018 Jun 30.
We study the short- and long-term price effects of the number of competing firms, using panel-data on 1303 distinct pharmaceutical markets for 78 months within a reference-price system. We use actual transaction prices in an institutional setting with little scope for non-price competition and where simultaneity problems can be addressed effectively. In the long term, the price of generics is found to decrease by 81% when the number of firms selling generics with the same strength, form and similar package size is increased from 1 to 10. Nearly only competition at this fine-grained level matters; the effect of firms selling other products with the same active substance, but with different package size, form, or strength, is only a tenths as large. Half of the price reductions take place immediately and 70% within three months. Also, prices of originals are found to react to competition, but far less and much slower.
我们使用参考定价制度下 1303 个不同的药品市场 78 个月的面板数据，研究了竞争企业数量的短期和长期价格效应。我们在一个机构环境中使用实际交易价格，这里几乎没有非价格竞争的空间，并且可以有效地解决同时性问题。长期来看，当销售具有相同强度、形式和类似包装尺寸的仿制药的企业数量从 1 家增加到 10 家时，通用药品的价格发现下降了 81%。只有在这种细粒度的竞争水平上才有显著影响；销售具有相同活性物质但包装尺寸、形式或强度不同的其他产品的企业的影响仅为十分之一左右。一半的价格降幅是立即发生的，70%在三个月内发生。此外，还发现原始药品的价格会对竞争做出反应，但程度要小得多，速度也慢得多。
