Antoñanzas F, Juárez-Castelló C A, Rodríguez-Ibeas R
Department of Economics, University of La Rioja, 26004, Logroño, Spain.
Int J Health Econ Manag. 2017 Dec;17(4):413-432. doi: 10.1007/s10754-017-9216-x. Epub 2017 May 15.
In this paper we carry out a vertical differentiation duopoly model applied to pharmaceutical markets to analyze how endogenous and exogenous generic reference pricing influence competition between generic and branded drugs producers. Unlike the literature, we characterize for the exogenous case the equilibrium prices for all feasible relevant reference prices. Competition is enhanced after the introduction of a reference pricing system. We also compare both reference pricing systems on welfare grounds, assuming two different objective functions for health authorities: (i) standard social welfare and (ii) gross consumer surplus net of total pharmaceutical expenditures. We show that regardless of the objective function, health authorities will never choose endogenous reference pricing. When health authorities are paternalistic, the exogenous reference price that maximizes standard social welfare is such that the price of the generic drug is the reference price while the price of the branded drug is higher than the reference price. When health authorities are not paternalistic, the optimal exogenous reference price is such that the price of the branded drug is the reference price while the price of the generic drug is lower than the reference price.
在本文中，我们构建了一个应用于药品市场的垂直差异化双头垄断模型，以分析内生和外生仿制药参考定价如何影响仿制药和品牌药生产商之间的竞争。与现有文献不同的是，我们针对外生情况，刻画了所有可行相关参考价格下的均衡价格。引入参考定价系统后竞争加剧。我们还基于福利理由比较了这两种参考定价系统，假定卫生当局有两种不同的目标函数：（i）标准社会福利，以及（ii）扣除药品总支出后的消费者总剩余。我们表明，无论目标函数如何，卫生当局永远不会选择内生参考定价。当卫生当局具有家长式作风时，使标准社会福利最大化的外生参考价格是仿制药价格为参考价格，而品牌药价格高于参考价格。当卫生当局不具有家长式作风时，最优外生参考价格是品牌药价格为参考价格，而仿制药价格低于参考价格。
