Department of Philosophy, Birkbeck College, University of London, London, UK.
Department of Philosophy, King's College London, London, UK.
J Med Humanit. 2020 Sep;41(3):363-378. doi: 10.1007/s10912-018-9519-z.
Spirit possession is a common phenomenon around the world in which a non-corporeal agent is involved with a human host. This manifests in a range of maladies or in displacement of the host's agency and identity. Prompted by engagement with the phenomenon in Egypt, this paper draws connections between spirit possession and the concepts of personhood and intentionality. It employs these concepts to articulate spirit possession, while also developing the intentional stance as formulated by Daniel Dennett. It argues for an understanding of spirit possession as the spirit stance: an intentional strategy that aims at predicting and explaining behaviour by ascribing to an agent (the spirit) beliefs and desires but is only deployed once the mental states and activity of the subject (the person) fail specific normative distinctions. Applied to behaviours that are generally taken to signal mental disorder, the spirit stance preserves a peculiar form of intentionality where behaviour would otherwise be explained as a consequence of a malfunctioning physical mechanism. Centuries before the modern disciplines of psychoanalysis and phenomenological-psychopathology endeavoured to restore meaning to 'madness,' the social institution of spirit possession had been preserving the intentionality of socially deviant behaviour.
在世界各地,灵魂附身是一种常见的现象,其中一个非物质的实体与人类宿主有关。这种现象表现为一系列疾病,或者是宿主的代理和身份的转移。本文受埃及对该现象的研究启发,在人格和意向性的概念之间建立了灵魂附身和这些概念之间的联系。它运用这些概念来表达灵魂附身,同时发展了丹尼尔·丹尼特提出的意向立场。它认为,灵魂附身可以被理解为灵魂立场:一种旨在通过将信念和欲望归因于一个实体(灵魂)来预测和解释行为的意向策略,但只有在主体(人)的心理状态和活动未能符合特定规范区分时才会采用。将灵魂立场应用于通常被视为精神障碍信号的行为,保留了一种特殊形式的意向性,否则,这些行为将被解释为物理机制故障的结果。在现代精神分析学和现象学-精神病理学努力为“疯狂”恢复意义的几个世纪之前,灵魂附身的社会制度就一直在维护社会越轨行为的意向性。