Slors Marc
Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
Philosophia (Ramat Gan). 2015;43(3):579-591. doi: 10.1007/s11406-015-9627-1. Epub 2015 Dec 8.
In this paper I assess the extent to which Daniel Dennett's Intentional Stance Theory fits into the overall proposal for a programme on naturalizing mental content outlined by Daniel Hutto and Glenda Satne in this issue (Philosophia 43, 2015). I argue that in order to fit the proposal, two changes need to be made: (1) the reality of intentional states should not (just) be grounded in the reality of behavioral patterns but in the ascription-independent status of Ur-intentionality that is the at the root of all intentionality, including content-involving intentonality. This is tricky since (i) Ur-intentionality resembles 'original intentionality', which is a notion Dennett rejects, and (ii) the ascription-dependent status of content-involving intentionality should be kept intact. (2) adopting the intentional stance is possible only as part of socio-cultural practices, which implies that this is an exclusively human capacity. I also argue that both changes to the theory are feasible and should be considered improvements relative to the original position developed by Dennett.
在本文中，我评估丹尼尔·丹尼特的意向立场理论在多大程度上符合丹尼尔·胡托和格伦达·萨特内在本期（《哲学》，2015年第43卷）中概述的将心理内容自然化的总体方案。我认为，为了符合该方案，需要做出两点改变：（1）意向状态的实在性不应（仅仅）基于行为模式的实在性，而应基于原初意向性的独立于归属的地位，原初意向性是所有意向性的根源，包括涉及内容的意向性。这很棘手，因为（i）原初意向性类似于“原初意向性”，而这是丹尼特所拒绝的概念，以及（ii）涉及内容的意向性的依赖于归属的地位应保持不变。（2）只有作为社会文化实践的一部分，才有可能采取意向立场，这意味着这是一种人类独有的能力。我还认为，对该理论的这两点改变都是可行的，相对于丹尼特最初提出的立场而言，应该被视为改进。
