J Med Ethics. 2019 Apr;45(4):275-276. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2018-105030. Epub 2018 Aug 22.
Gabriele Badano offers three criticisms of my challenge to the orthodox family of theories of legitimacy in bioethics. First, I assumed an 'oversimplified version of the orthodoxy'. Second, I failed to appreciate its domain of application. Third, I only addressed the ways in which orthodox theorists incorporate substance as an 'afterthought'-and, even then, only by rehashing Gopal Sreenivasan's argument. Here, I respond to each, taking up the first and third before ending with reflections on the second. The first underestimates the insight that criticism of the simplified version provides to that of the more complex relatives. The third misunderstands the relationship between my view and Sreenivasan's and neglects an entire argument of my paper. The second fails in light of these two, but raises interesting questions about how the method I suggest might be extended to other domains.
加布里埃尔·巴达诺对我对生物伦理学正统理论家族的挑战提出了三点批评。首先,我假设了一个“过于简化的正统版本”。其次,我没有意识到它的应用范围。第三,我只探讨了正统理论家如何将实质内容作为“事后想法”纳入其中——即使是这样,也只是重述了戈帕尔·斯里尼瓦桑的论点。在这里,我将逐个回应每一点,先处理第一点和第三点,最后再思考第二点。第一点低估了对简化版本的批评对更复杂版本的启示。第三点误解了我与斯里尼瓦桑观点之间的关系,并忽略了我论文中的一整个论点。第二点在这两点的影响下失败了,但它提出了一些关于我所建议的方法如何扩展到其他领域的有趣问题。