Gunnemyr Mattias
Department of Philosophy, The Faculties of Humanities and Theology, Lund University, Box 192, Helgonavägen 3, 221 00 Lund, Sweden.
Philosophia (Ramat Gan). 2017;45(1):227-246. doi: 10.1007/s11406-016-9766-z. Epub 2016 Sep 23.
In (2011) Derek Parfit advocates the Kantian Contractualist Formula as one of three supreme moral principles. In important cases, this formula entails that it is wrong for an agent to act in a way that would be partially best. In contrast, Parfit's wide value-based objective view of reasons entails that the agent often have sufficient reasons to perform such acts. It seems then that agents might have sufficient reasons to act wrongly. In this paper I will argue that such reasons are a symptom of a fundamental inconsistency between the Kantian Contractualist Formula and Parfit's view of reasons. The formula requires that we consider what could rationally will, while a wide value-based objective view requires that we consider only what has sufficient reasons for doing. The same inconsistency is particularly obvious in Parfit's version of the Consent Principle, which share important features with the Kantian Contractualist Formula. Parfit accepts that moral principles might entail that we sometimes have sufficient reasons to act wrongly. However, to accept that supreme moral principles have such implications is objectionable if you, like Parfit, also hold that principles with such implications should be rejected or revised. I suggest that we could abandon the requirement that we have to consider the reasons of everyone. This would make the Kantian Contractualist Formula consistent with Parfit's view of reasons, at least in this respect. I also argue that we can keep most implications of the Kantian Contractualist Formula that Parfit finds attractive.
德里克·帕菲特在（2011年）主张将康德契约主义公式作为三条最高道德原则之一。在重要情形中，该公式意味着，行为主体以局部最优的方式行事是错误的。相比之下，帕菲特基于价值的宽泛客观理由观则意味着，行为主体常常有充分的理由去实施此类行为。如此看来，行为主体可能有充分的理由去做错事。在本文中，我将论证，此类理由是康德契约主义公式与帕菲特理由观之间根本不一致的一种表现。该公式要求我们考虑一个人能够理性地意愿之事，而基于价值的宽泛客观理由观则要求我们只考虑一个人有充分理由去做之事。同样的不一致在帕菲特版本的同意原则中尤为明显，该原则与康德契约主义公式有重要的共同特征。帕菲特承认，道德原则可能意味着我们有时有充分的理由去做错事。然而，如果你像帕菲特一样，也认为有此类含义的原则应当被拒绝或修正，那么接受最高道德原则有这样的含义就是令人反感的。我建议我们可以放弃必须考虑每个人的理由这一要求。这将使康德契约主义公式与帕菲特的理由观保持一致，至少在这方面是如此。我还论证说，我们可以保留帕菲特认为有吸引力的康德契约主义公式的大多数含义。
