Lawlor Rob
J Med Ethics. 2015 Nov;41(11):893-6. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2014-102391. Epub 2015 May 20.
Authors such as Tony Hope and Julian Savulescu appeal to Derek Parfit's non-identity problem in relation to particular questions in applied ethics, and particularly in reproductive ethics. They argue that the non-identity problem shows that an individual cannot be harmed by being brought into existence, and therefore, we cannot say that the individual is harmed if, for example, we select an embryo in order to have a deaf child. Thus, they argue that an appeal to the non-identity problem blocks (or significantly reduces the force of) objections in a number of cases. I argue that these discussions often give the impression that this is a clear conclusion, shared by most philosophers, and largely beyond dispute. This is particularly significant because these discussions are often in journals or books with an interdisciplinary readership. My concern is that they give the impression of stating: 'philosophers have studied this issue, and this is the conclusion they have reached. Now I will emphasise the implications for medical ethics'. I argue that, far from being the consensus view, the view presented by Hope and Savulescu is rejected by many, including Parfit himself.
托尼·霍普和朱利安·萨夫勒斯库等作者在应用伦理学的特定问题，尤其是生殖伦理学问题上，诉诸德里克·帕菲特的非同一性问题。他们认为，非同一性问题表明，一个人不会因被生出来而受到伤害，因此，比如说，如果我们选择一个胚胎以生出一个失聪的孩子，我们不能说这个个体受到了伤害。因此，他们认为，诉诸非同一性问题在许多情况下能阻止（或显著削弱）反对意见。我认为，这些讨论常常给人一种印象，即这是一个大多数哲学家都认同且基本无可争议的明确结论。这一点尤为重要，因为这些讨论常常出现在面向跨学科读者的期刊或书籍中。我担心它们给人的印象是在陈述：“哲学家们研究了这个问题，这就是他们得出的结论。现在我将强调其对医学伦理学的影响”。我认为，霍普和萨夫勒斯库所提出的观点远非共识性观点，包括帕菲特本人在内的许多人都予以驳斥。
