Department of Biology, University of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, USA
Courant Institute, New York University, NY, USA.
J R Soc Interface. 2018 Sep;15(146). doi: 10.1098/rsif.2018.0429.
Biological macromolecules encode information: some of it to endow the molecule with structural flexibility, some of it to enable molecular actions as a catalyst or a substrate, but a residual part can be used to communicate with other macromolecules. Thus, macromolecules do not need to possess information only to survive in an environment, but also to strategically interact with others by sending signals to a receiving macromolecule that can properly interpret the signal and act suitably. These sender-receiver signalling games are sustained by the information asymmetry that exists among the macromolecules. In both biochemistry and molecular evolution, the important role of information asymmetry remains largely unaddressed. Here, we provide a new unifying perspective on the impact of information symmetry between macromolecules on molecular evolutionary processes, while focusing on molecular deception. Biomolecular games arise from the ability of biological macromolecules to exert precise recognition, and their role as units of selection, meaning that they are subject to competition and cooperation with other macromolecules. Thus, signalling game theory can be used to better understand fundamental features of living systems such as molecular recognition, molecular mimicry, selfish elements and 'junk' DNA. We show how deceptive behaviour at the molecular level indicates a conflict of interest, and so provides evidence of genetic conflict. This model proposes that molecular deception is diagnostic of selfish behaviour, helping to explain the evasive behaviour of transposable elements in 'junk' DNA, for example. Additionally, in this broad review, a range of major evolutionary transitions are shown to be associated with the establishment of signalling conventions, many of which are susceptible to molecular deception. These perspectives allow us to assign rudimentary behaviour to macromolecules, and show how participation in signalling games differentiates biochemistry from abiotic chemistry.
其中一些赋予分子结构灵活性,一些使分子作为催化剂或底物发挥作用,但还有一部分可用于与其他大分子进行通信。因此,大分子不仅需要拥有在环境中生存所需的信息,还需要通过向接收大分子发送信号来进行策略性的相互作用,使接收大分子能够正确地解读信号并做出适当的反应。这些发送方-接收方信号传递游戏依赖于大分子之间存在的信息不对称性。在生物化学和分子进化中,信息不对称的重要作用在很大程度上尚未得到解决。在这里,我们提供了一个新的统一视角,研究了大分子之间信息对称性对分子进化过程的影响,同时聚焦于分子欺骗。生物分子博弈源于生物大分子施加精确识别的能力,以及它们作为选择单位的作用,这意味着它们与其他大分子相互竞争与合作。因此,信号传递博弈论可以用于更好地理解生命系统的基本特征,如分子识别、分子模拟、自私元件和“垃圾”DNA。我们展示了分子水平上的欺骗行为如何表明存在利益冲突,从而提供了遗传冲突的证据。该模型提出,分子欺骗是自私行为的诊断指标,有助于解释例如“垃圾”DNA 中转座元件的逃避行为。此外,在这个广泛的综述中,许多主要的进化转变都与信号传递惯例的建立有关,其中许多惯例容易受到分子欺骗的影响。这些观点使我们能够为大分子赋予基本行为,并展示了参与信号传递游戏如何使生物化学有别于非生物化学。