Max Planck Institute for Human Development.
Psychol Rev. 2018 Oct;125(5):844-849. doi: 10.1037/rev0000121.
Regenwetter and Robinson (2017) discuss a challenging construct-behavior gap in psychological research. It can emerge when testing hypotheses that pertain to a theoretical construct (e.g., preferences) on the basis of observed behavior (e.g., actual choices). The problem is that the different heuristic methods that are sometimes used to link overt choices to covert preferences may ignore heterogeneity between and within individuals, rendering inferences drawn from choices to preferences invalid. Regenwetter and Robinson's remedy is to make heterogeneity an explicit part of the theory. They illustrate the problem and a remedy to it with the description-experience gap (D-E gap), the systematic gap in choices based on described versus 'experienced' probabilities. We welcome their sophisticated reanalysis of some early data sets, which, by taking heterogeneity into account, finds strong evidence for a D-E gap in probability weighting. Yet we see three issues with the remedy, which we likewise highlight using the D-E gap. First, the D-E gap cannot be reduced solely to probability weighting but rather unfolds across several different psychological constructs suggesting that part of the construct-behavior gap may stem from trying to reduce multidimensional behavior to a single construct. Second, the authors' modeling of heterogeneity leaves aside the heterogeneity of people's sampled experience in decisions from experience, which highlights the importance of also considering the potential causes of heterogeneity. Third, we identify potential sources of heterogeneity in choice behavior that go beyond probabilistic responses and preferences and advocate for a pluralistic approach to modeling it. Last but not least, we emphasize that, notwithstanding the importance of rigor and logical coherence in scientific theories, simplifications and (false) generalizations are indispensable in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).
雷根沃特和罗宾逊（2017）讨论了心理学研究中一个具有挑战性的构念-行为差距。当根据观察到的行为（例如实际选择）来检验与理论构念（例如偏好）相关的假设时，就会出现这种差距。问题在于，有时用于将明显的选择与隐蔽的偏好联系起来的不同启发式方法可能忽略了个体之间和内部的异质性，从而使从选择中得出的偏好推断无效。雷根沃特和罗宾逊的补救措施是将异质性作为理论的一个明确部分。他们用描述-体验差距（D-E 差距）来说明这个问题及其补救措施，这是基于描述与“体验”概率的选择之间的系统性差距。我们欢迎他们对一些早期数据集的复杂重新分析，通过考虑异质性，该分析发现了概率加权中存在强烈的 D-E 差距的证据。然而，我们看到补救措施有三个问题，我们同样使用 D-E 差距来强调这些问题。首先，D-E 差距不能仅仅归因于概率加权，而是跨越几个不同的心理构念展开，这表明构念-行为差距的一部分可能源于试图将多维行为简化为单一构念。其次，作者对异质性的建模忽略了人们在经验决策中抽样经验的异质性，这突出了考虑异质性潜在原因的重要性。第三，我们确定了选择行为中除了概率反应和偏好之外的潜在异质源，并提倡采用多元化的方法来对其进行建模。最后但并非最不重要的一点是，我们强调，尽管科学理论的严谨性和逻辑一致性非常重要，但在追求科学知识时，简化和（错误）概括是不可或缺的。（PsycINFO 数据库记录（c）2018 APA，保留所有权利）。
