Brandstätter Eduard, Gigerenzer Gerd, Hertwig Ralph
Department of Psychology, Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Altenbergerstrasse 69, 4040 Linz, Austria.
Psychol Rev. 2006 Apr;113(2):409-32. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.113.2.409.
Bernoulli's framework of expected utility serves as a model for various psychological processes, including motivation, moral sense, attitudes, and decision making. To account for evidence at variance with expected utility, the authors generalize the framework of fast and frugal heuristics from inferences to preferences. The priority heuristic predicts (a) the Allais paradox, (b) risk aversion for gains if probabilities are high, (c) risk seeking for gains if probabilities are low (e.g., lottery tickets), (d) risk aversion for losses if probabilities are low (e.g., buying insurance), (e) risk seeking for losses if probabilities are high, (f) the certainty effect, (g) the possibility effect, and (h) intransitivities. The authors test how accurately the heuristic predicts people's choices, compared with previously proposed heuristics and 3 modifications of expected utility theory: security-potential/aspiration theory, transfer-of-attention-exchange model, and cumulative prospect theory.
伯努利的预期效用框架作为各种心理过程的模型，包括动机、道德感、态度和决策。为了解释与预期效用不一致的证据，作者将快速节俭启发式框架从推理推广到偏好。优先启发式预测：（a）阿莱悖论；（b）如果概率高则对收益风险厌恶；（c）如果概率低则对收益风险寻求（如彩票）；（d）如果概率低则对损失风险厌恶（如购买保险）；（e）如果概率高则对损失风险寻求；（f）确定性效应；（g）可能性效应；以及（h）非传递性。作者测试了与先前提出的启发式方法以及预期效用理论的三种修正方法（安全潜力/期望理论、注意力转移交换模型和累积前景理论）相比，该启发式方法对人们选择的预测准确性如何。
