Department of Psychology.
Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Brown University.
J Pers Soc Psychol. 2019 Feb;116(2):215-236. doi: 10.1037/pspa0000137. Epub 2018 Oct 25.
Six experiments examine people's updating of blame judgments and test predictions developed from a socially regulated blame perspective. According to this perspective, blame emerged in human history as a socially costly tool for regulating other's behavior. Because it is costly for both blamers and violators, blame is typically constrained by requirements for "warrant"-evidence that one's moral judgment is justified. This requirement motivates people to systematically process available causal and mental information surrounding a violation. That is, people are relatively calibrated and evenhanded in utilizing evidence that either amplifies or mitigates blame. Such systematic processing should be particularly visible when people update their moral judgments. Using a novel experimental paradigm, we test 2 sets of predictions derived from the socially regulated blame perspective and compare them with predictions from a motivated-blame perspective. Studies 1-4 demonstrate (across student, Internet, and community samples) that moral perceivers systematically grade updated blame judgments in response to the strength of new causal and mental information, without anchoring on initial evaluations. Further, these studies reveal that perceivers update blame judgments symmetrically in response to exacerbating and mitigating information, inconsistent with motivated-blame predictions. Study 5 shows that graded and symmetric blame updating is robust under cognitive load. Lastly, Study 6 demonstrates that biases can emerge once the social requirement for warrant is relaxed-as in the case of judging outgroup members. We conclude that social constraints on blame judgments render the normal process of blame well calibrated to causal and mental information, and biases may appear when such constraints are absent. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
六项实验检验了人们对责备判断的更新,并检验了从社会调节责备视角得出的预测。根据这一观点,责备在人类历史上作为一种社会成本高昂的工具而出现,用于规范他人的行为。因为它对责备者和违规者都有代价,所以责备通常受到“保证”的要求的限制——即证明自己的道德判断是合理的证据。这种要求促使人们系统地处理违反行为周围可用的因果和心理信息。也就是说,人们在利用放大或减轻责备的证据时,相对校准和公平。这种系统的处理应该在人们更新他们的道德判断时特别明显。我们使用一种新的实验范式,检验了从社会调节责备视角得出的两组预测,并将其与从动机责备视角得出的预测进行了比较。研究 1-4 表明(通过学生、互联网和社区样本),道德感知者会根据新的因果和心理信息的强度系统地对更新后的责备判断进行评分,而不会以初始评价为基准。此外,这些研究表明,感知者会根据加剧和减轻信息对称地更新责备判断,这与动机责备的预测不一致。研究 5 表明,在认知负荷下,分级和对称的责备更新是稳健的。最后,研究 6 表明,一旦放松了保证的社会要求——例如在判断外群体成员时,就会出现偏见。我们的结论是,对责备判断的社会约束使责备的正常过程与因果和心理信息很好地协调一致,而当这种约束不存在时,偏见可能会出现。(心理学信息数据库记录(c)2019 APA,保留所有权利)。