Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, 44780 Bochum, Germany.
Conscious Cogn. 2018 Nov;66:91-100. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2018.11.002. Epub 2018 Nov 15.
This paper exposes a methodological dilemma arising for the research program of finding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC), the minimal set of brain processes sufficient for a particular percept. The main claim is that it is doubtful that the right kind of correlations will ever be obtained because the foregoing conceptual decisions regarding the relations between consciousness, attention, cognitive access, report, and other cognitive functions determine the interpretation of the correlation data that can be obtained. Relying on subjective reports likely leads to confounding the NCC with neural mechanisms for cognitive functions because reports presuppose cognitive access. No-report paradigms are in danger of confounding the NCC with neural mechanisms underlying unconscious processes. So there does not seem to be a way of making sure to have isolated the neural correlate of conscious experience.
本文揭示了在寻找意识的神经相关物（NCC）的研究计划中出现的方法论困境，该研究计划旨在找到对于特定感知来说足够的最小的脑过程集合。主要观点是，获得正确类型的相关性是值得怀疑的，因为在意识、注意力、认知接入、报告和其他认知功能之间的关系方面的概念决策决定了可以获得的相关性数据的解释。依赖主观报告很可能会将 NCC 与认知功能的神经机制混淆，因为报告假定了认知接入。无报告范式则可能将 NCC 与无意识过程的神经机制混淆。因此，似乎没有一种方法可以确保将意识体验的神经相关物孤立出来。
