Chen Josie I, Kamei Kenju
Department of Economics, National Taipei University, No.151, Daxue Rd., Sanxia Dist., New Taipei City, 23741 Taiwan, ROC.
2Department of Economics and Finance, Durham University, Mill Hill Lane, Durham, DH1 3LB UK.
Exp Econ. 2018;21(4):836-857. doi: 10.1007/s10683-017-9554-z. Epub 2017 Nov 13.
Past experimental research has shown that when rating systems are available, buyers are more generous in accepting unfair offers in ultimatum bargaining. However, it also suggests that, under these conditions, sellers behave more fairly to avoid receiving negative feedback. This paper experimentally investigates which effect is stronger with the use of a rating system: buyers' inflated inequity acceptance or sellers' disapproval aversion. We explore this question by varying the information condition on the buyers' side. Our experiment shows that in a setup where the size of the pie is common knowledge for both buyers and sellers, when a rating system is present, the sellers exhibit disapproval aversion but the buyers do not display greater acceptance of inequity. By contrast, when only sellers are aware of the size of the pie, sellers behave aggressively to exploit buyers and their behavior does not change in the presence of a rating system; however, buyers display greater acceptance of inequity when a rating system is present. We discuss how these results can be explained by a theoretical model that includes sellers' social disapproval aversion and buyers' disappointment aversion in addition to the players' inequality aversion.
过去的实验研究表明，当存在评级系统时，在最后通牒博弈中买家在接受不公平报价时会更加宽容。然而，这也表明，在这些情况下，卖家会表现得更加公平以避免收到负面反馈。本文通过实验研究使用评级系统时哪种效应更强：买家对不公平的过度接受还是卖家对负面评价的厌恶。我们通过改变买家一方的信息条件来探讨这个问题。我们的实验表明，在买卖双方都知道馅饼大小的情况下，当存在评级系统时，卖家表现出对负面评价的厌恶，但买家并没有表现出对不公平的更大接受度。相比之下，当只有卖家知道馅饼大小的时候，卖家会积极地利用买家，并且他们的行为在有评级系统的情况下不会改变；然而，当存在评级系统时，买家对不公平表现出更大的接受度。我们讨论了如何通过一个理论模型来解释这些结果，该模型除了参与者的不平等厌恶之外，还包括卖家的社会负面评价厌恶和买家的失望厌恶。
