Daniel TE, Seale DA, Rapoport A
University of Alberta
J Math Psychol. 1998 Jun;42(2/3):133-66. doi: 10.1006/jmps.1998.1220.
We report the results of two experiments on bilateral bargaining under the sealed-bid double auction mechanism in environments where theory calls for decidedly strategic play. The observed individual sellers' ask functions and buyers' bid functions, each based on 50 rounds of bargaining, are shown to be in good agreement with the Bayesian-Nash piecewise linear equilibrium solution of Chatterjee & Samuelson (1983). Although the game is played with random matching of traders on each round, both sellers and buyers change their behavior over time. The buyers in particular learn to bid more aggressively. The information sets of the two players are shown to be a major determinant of this result and of the strikingly disparate profits earned by buyer and seller during the experiment. To address the dynamics of this result, we propose a simple adaptive learning model postulating round-to-round changes in the entire bid/ask function which are proportional to the actual gain, if a deal was struck, or the gain that could have been but was not realized, if no agreement was reached on the previous round. Based on results from the experimental psychology literature, this model captures the major features of the mean bid/ask functions and accounts for most of the trial-to-trial variability in the buyers', but not the sellers', decisions. Copyright 1998 Academic Press.
我们报告了在密封投标双重拍卖机制下，在理论要求进行明确策略性博弈的环境中进行双边讨价还价的两个实验结果。观察到的个体卖家的要价函数和买家的出价函数，每个都基于50轮讨价还价，结果显示与Chatterjee和Samuelson（1983）的贝叶斯 - 纳什分段线性均衡解高度一致。尽管该博弈在每一轮中都是交易员随机配对进行，但卖家和买家的行为都会随时间变化。特别是买家学会了更积极地出价。实验表明，双方参与者的信息集是这一结果以及实验期间买卖双方获得显著不同利润的主要决定因素。为了解决这一结果的动态变化，我们提出了一个简单的适应性学习模型，假设整个出价/要价函数的逐轮变化与实际收益成正比（如果达成交易），或者与如果上一轮未达成协议本可实现但未实现的收益成正比。基于实验心理学文献的结果，该模型捕捉了平均出价/要价函数的主要特征，并解释了买家决策中大部分的逐次试验变异性，但无法解释卖家决策中的变异性。版权所有1998年学术出版社。
