Katz Rebecca, Graeden Ellie, Abe Keishi, Attal-Juncqua Aurelia, Boyce Matthew R, Eaneff Stephanie
Georgetown University Center for Global Health Science and Security, 3900 Reservoir Road, NW Washington, DC 20007, USA.
Talus Analytics, Boulder, CO, USA.
Heliyon. 2018 Dec 27;4(12):e01091. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2018.e01091. eCollection 2018 Dec.
Recent infectious disease outbreaks have brought increased attention to the need to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to natural biological threats. However, deliberate biological events also represent a significant global threat, but have received relatively little attention. While the Biological Weapons Convention provides a foundation for the response to deliberate biological events, the political mechanisms to respond to and recover from such an event are poorly defined.
We performed an analysis of the epidemiological timeline, the international policies triggered as a notional deliberate biological event unfolds, and the corresponding stakeholders and mandates assigned by each policy.
The results of this analysis identify a significant gap in both policy and stakeholder mandates: there is no single policy nor stakeholder mandate for leading and coordinating response activities associated with a deliberate biological event. These results were visualized using an open source web-based tool published at https://dbe.talusanalytics.com.
While there are organizations and stakeholders responsible for leading security or public health response, these roles are non-overlapping and are led by organizations not with limited interaction outside such events. The lack of mandates highlights a gap in the mechanisms available to coordinate response and a gap in guidance for managing the response. The results of the analysis corroborate anecdotal evidence from stakeholder meetings and highlight a critical need and gap in deliberate biological response policy.
近期的传染病爆发使人们更加关注加强全球预防、检测和应对自然生物威胁的能力的必要性。然而,蓄意的生物事件也构成重大的全球威胁,但受到的关注相对较少。虽然《生物武器公约》为应对蓄意生物事件奠定了基础,但应对此类事件并从中恢复的政治机制却界定不清。
我们对流行病学时间线、作为假想的蓄意生物事件展开时触发的国际政策以及每项政策所指定的相应利益相关者和任务进行了分析。
该分析结果表明,在政策和利益相关者任务方面存在重大差距:没有单一的政策或利益相关者任务来领导和协调与蓄意生物事件相关的应对活动。这些结果通过发布在https://dbe.talusanalytics.com的基于网络的开源工具进行了可视化展示。
虽然有组织和利益相关者负责领导安全或公共卫生应对工作,但这些角色并不重叠,且由在此类事件之外互动有限的组织牵头。任务的缺失凸显了可用于协调应对的机制方面的差距以及应对管理指导方面的差距。分析结果证实了利益相关者会议的传闻证据,并突出了蓄意生物应对政策方面的迫切需求和差距。