Archer Alfred, Engelen Bart, Ivanković Viktor
Department of Philosophy, Tilburg School of Humanities, Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB Tilburg, The Netherlands.
2Doctoral School of Political Science, Public Policy and International Relations, Central European University, Nador u. 9, Budapest, 1051 Hungary.
Res Publica. 2019;25(1):39-54. doi: 10.1007/s11158-017-9371-4. Epub 2017 Nov 13.
What limits should there be on the areas of life that are governed by market forces? For many years, no one seriously defended the buying and selling votes for political elections. In recent years, however, this situation has changed, with a number of authors defending the permissibility of vote markets (e.g. Freiman 2014). One popular objection to such markets is that they would lead to a tyranny of wealth, where the poor are politically dominated by the rich. In a recent paper, Taylor ( 23(3):313-328, 2017. doi:10.1007/s11158-016-9327-0) has argued that this objection can be avoided if certain restrictions are placed on vote markets. In this paper we will argue that this attempt to rebut an argument against vote markets is unsuccessful. vote markets secure their purported benefits but then they inevitably lead to a tyranny of wealth, they are restricted so heavily that they lack the features that have been claimed to make vote markets attractive in the first place. Using Taylor's proposal as a test case, we make the more general claim that vote markets cannot avoid the tyranny of wealth objection and bring about their supposed benefits at the same time.
由市场力量主导的生活领域应该有哪些限制呢？多年来，没有人认真为政治选举中的选票买卖辩护。然而，近年来这种情况发生了变化，一些作者为选票市场的可允许性进行了辩护（例如，弗赖曼，2014年）。对这种市场的一种常见反对意见是，它们会导致财富专制，穷人在政治上会被富人支配。在最近的一篇论文中，泰勒（《经济学与哲学》，第23卷第3期，第313 - 328页，2017年。doi:10.1007/s11158 - 016 - 9327 - 0）认为，如果对选票市场施加某些限制，这种反对意见是可以避免的。在本文中，我们将论证，这种反驳反对选票市场观点的尝试是不成功的。选票市场在确保其所谓好处的同时，不可避免地会导致财富专制，或者它们受到如此严格的限制，以至于缺乏一开始被认为使选票市场具有吸引力的特征。以泰勒的提议作为一个测试案例，我们提出一个更普遍的观点，即选票市场无法避免财富专制的反对意见，同时实现其所谓的好处。
