China Institute of Manufacturing Development, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing, Jiangsu 210044, China.
School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology, Nanjing 210044, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2019 Mar 27;16(7):1093. doi: 10.3390/ijerph16071093.
The carbon emission problem in China needs to be solved urgently. Industrial symbiosis, as an effective means to improve resource efficiency, can better alleviate the carbon emission problem. Under such a circumstance, this paper regards an industrial symbiosis system as a collection of producers, consumers and decomposers, and analyzes the strategic selections and behavioral characteristics of their carbon emission reduction activities through a tripartite evolutionary game model, and then the effects of related parameters on the evolutionary stable strategies of stakeholders are discussed. The results demonstrate that: (1) the regular return and the rate of return determine the ability of stakeholders to undertake carbon reduction activities; (2) the initial willingness of stakeholders to participate will affect the evolutionary speed of the strategies; (3) a high opportunity cost reduces the inertia of stakeholders to carry out carbon emission reductions; (4) producers, consumers and decomposers can avoid "free rides" by signing agreements or adopting punitive measures.
中国的碳排放问题亟待解决。工业共生作为提高资源效率的有效手段，可以更好地缓解碳排放问题。在这种情况下，本文将工业共生系统视为生产者、消费者和分解者的集合，通过三方演化博弈模型分析了其减排活动的战略选择和行为特征，并探讨了相关参数对利益相关者演化稳定策略的影响。结果表明：（1）正规报酬和回报率决定了利益相关者承担碳减排活动的能力；（2）利益相关者参与的初始意愿会影响策略的演化速度；（3）高机会成本降低了利益相关者进行碳减排的惯性；（4）生产者、消费者和分解者可以通过签订协议或采取惩罚措施来避免“搭便车”。
