Williamson Jon
Philosophy Department, SECL, University of Kent, Kent, CT2 7NF UK.
Eur J Philos Sci. 2018;8(3):559-586. doi: 10.1007/s13194-018-0201-0. Epub 2018 Mar 13.
This paper presents a new argument for the Principle of Indifference. This argument can be thought of in two ways: as a pragmatic argument, justifying the principle as needing to hold if one is to minimise worst-case expected loss, or as an epistemic argument, justifying the principle as needing to hold in order to minimise worst-case expected inaccuracy. The question arises as to which interpretation is preferable. I show that the epistemic argument contradicts Evidentialism and suggest that the relative plausibility of Evidentialism provides grounds to prefer the pragmatic interpretation. If this is right, it extends to a general preference for pragmatic arguments for the Principle of Indifference, and also to a general preference for pragmatic arguments for other norms of Bayesian epistemology.
本文提出了一种支持无差别原则的新论证。该论证可以从两种角度来思考：作为一种实用主义论证，即若要将最坏情况下的预期损失最小化，就需要支持该原则；或者作为一种认知论证，即若要将最坏情况下的预期不准确性最小化，就需要支持该原则。由此产生了一个问题：哪种解释更可取。我表明认知论证与证据主义相矛盾，并认为证据主义的相对合理性为倾向于实用主义解释提供了依据。如果这是正确的，那么它不仅适用于对支持无差别原则的实用主义论证的普遍偏好，也适用于对支持贝叶斯认识论其他规范的实用主义论证的普遍偏好。
