Pettigrew Richard
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK.
Synthese. 2021;199(5-6):12407-12438. doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03338-7. Epub 2021 Aug 29.
In a series of papers over the past twenty years, and in a new book, Igor Douven (sometimes in collaboration with Sylvia Wenmackers) has argued that Bayesians are too quick to reject versions of inference to the best explanation that cannot be accommodated within their framework. In this paper, I survey their worries and attempt to answer them using a series of pragmatic and purely epistemic arguments that I take to show that Bayes' Rule really is the only rational way to respond to your evidence.
在过去二十年的一系列论文以及一本新书中，伊戈尔·杜文（有时与西尔维娅·温马克斯合作）认为，贝叶斯主义者太快拒绝那些无法在其框架内得到解释的最佳解释推理版本。在本文中，我将审视他们的担忧，并尝试用一系列实用主义和纯粹认知的论据来回应这些担忧，我认为这些论据表明贝叶斯法则确实是应对证据的唯一合理方式。
