School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Scotland, UK; Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.
School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Scotland, UK; Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.
Cognition. 2019 Aug;189:260-274. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2019.03.019. Epub 2019 Apr 20.
Everyone agrees that joint attention is a key feature of human social cognition. Yet, despite over 40 years of work and hundreds of publications on this topic, there is still surprisingly little agreement on what exactly joint attention is, and how the jointness in it is achieved. Part of the problem, we propose, is that joint attention is not a single process, but rather it includes a cluster of different cognitive skills and processes, and different researchers focus on different aspects of it. A similar problem applies to common knowledge. Here we present a new approach: We outline a typology of social attention levels which are currently all referred to in the literature as joint attention (from monitoring to common, mutual, and shared attention), along with corresponding levels of common knowledge. We consider cognitive, behavioral, and phenomenological aspects of the different levels as well as their different functions, and a key distinction we make in all of this is second-personal vs. third-personal relations. While we focus mainly on joint attention and common knowledge, we also briefly discuss how these levels might apply to other 'joint' mental states such as joint goals.
大家都认为共同注意是人类社会认知的一个关键特征。然而,尽管在这个主题上已经有超过 40 年的工作和数百篇出版物,但是对于共同注意究竟是什么,以及它是如何实现的,仍然存在惊人的分歧。我们认为,部分问题在于共同注意不是一个单一的过程,而是包括一系列不同的认知技能和过程,不同的研究人员关注它的不同方面。类似的问题也适用于共同知识。在这里,我们提出了一种新方法:我们概述了一种社会关注水平的类型学,这些水平目前在文献中都被称为共同注意(从监控到共同、相互和共享注意),以及相应的共同知识水平。我们考虑了不同水平的认知、行为和现象学方面,以及它们不同的功能,我们在这所有方面做出的一个关键区分是第二人称与第三人称关系。虽然我们主要关注共同注意和共同知识,但我们也简要讨论了这些水平如何适用于其他“共同”心理状态,如共同目标。