Monaghan Jake
University at Buffalo, Buffalo, New York, USA.
J Med Philos. 2019 May 18;44(3):355-377. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhz005.
Speciesist or biological accounts of moral status can be defended by showing that all members of Homo sapiens have a moral status conferring property. In this article, I argue that the most promising defense locates the moral status conferring property in the relational property of being biologically tied to other humans. This requires that biological ties ground moral obligations. I consider and reject the best defenses of that premise. Thus, we are left with compelling evidence that biological ties and membership in a biological category like "species" ground neither moral obligations nor moral status. Because it is crucial to account for the moral significance of family bonds, I conclude by describing the sense in which biological ties matter morally.
通过表明智人的所有成员都拥有赋予道德地位的属性，可以捍卫物种主义或关于道德地位的生物学解释。在本文中，我认为最有前景的辩护是将赋予道德地位的属性定位在与其他人类有生物学联系的关系属性中。这要求生物学联系奠定道德义务。我考虑并驳斥了该前提的最佳辩护。因此，我们得到了令人信服的证据，即生物学联系和诸如“物种”这样的生物类别中的成员身份既不能奠定道德义务，也不能奠定道德地位。由于解释家庭关系的道德意义至关重要，我最后描述了生物学联系在道德上重要的意义。
