Department of Zoology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z4;
Department of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences, University of Colorado Denver, Denver, CO 80204.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2019 Jul 9;116(28):14089-14097. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1810404116. Epub 2019 Jun 21.
Conflict between groups of individuals is a prevalent feature in human societies. A common theoretical explanation for intergroup conflict is that it provides benefits to individuals within groups in the form of reproduction-enhancing resources, such as food, territory, or mates. However, it is not always the case that conflict results from resource scarcity. Here, we show that intergroup conflict can evolve, despite not providing any benefits to individuals or their groups. The mechanism underlying this process is acculturation: the adoption, through coercion or imitation, of the victor's cultural traits. Acculturation acts as a cultural driver (in analogy to meiotic drivers) favoring the transmission of conflict, despite a potential cost to both the host group as a whole and to individuals in that group. We illustrate this process with a two-level model incorporating state-dependent event rates and evolving traits for both individuals and groups. Individuals can become "warriors" who specialize in intergroup conflicts, but are costly otherwise. Additionally, groups are characterized by cultural traits, such as their tendency to engage in conflict with other groups and their tendency for acculturation. We show that, if groups engage in conflicts, group selection will favor the production of warriors. Then, we show that group engagement can evolve if it is associated with acculturation. Finally, we study the coevolution of engagement and acculturation. Our model shows that horizontal transmission of culture between interacting groups can act as a cultural driver and lead to the maintenance of costly behaviors by both individuals and groups.
个体之间的冲突是人类社会的一个普遍特征。对于群体间冲突的一种常见理论解释是,它以增强生殖的资源(如食物、领土或配偶)的形式为群体内的个体提供好处。然而,冲突并不总是源于资源稀缺。在这里,我们表明,尽管群体间冲突不会给个人或他们的群体带来任何好处,但它可以进化。这一过程的机制是文化同化:通过强制或模仿,采用胜利者的文化特征。文化同化是一种文化驱动因素(类似于减数分裂驱动因素),有利于传播冲突,尽管这对整个宿主群体和该群体中的个体都可能带来潜在成本。我们用一个包含状态相关事件率和个体及群体进化特征的两级模型来说明这个过程。个体可以成为专门从事群体间冲突的“战士”,但代价很高。此外,群体的特征是文化特征,例如它们与其他群体发生冲突的倾向和同化的倾向。我们表明,如果群体发生冲突,群体选择将有利于战士的产生。然后,我们表明,如果与同化相关联,群体参与可以进化。最后,我们研究了参与和同化的共同进化。我们的模型表明,相互作用的群体之间的水平文化传播可以作为一种文化驱动因素,导致个体和群体都维持昂贵的行为。