Utrecht University School of Economics, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands.
Utrecht University School of Governance, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands.
PLoS One. 2019 Jun 26;14(6):e0218532. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0218532. eCollection 2019.
Financial and legal entities (e.g. banks, casinos, notaries etc.) have to report money laundering suspicions. Countries' engagement in fighting money laundering is evaluated-among others-with statistics on how often these suspicions are reported. Lack of compliance can result in economically harmful blacklisting. Nevertheless, these blacklists repeatedly become empty-in what is known as the emptying blacklist paradox. We develop a principal-agent model with intermediate agents and show that non-harmonized statistics can lead to strategic reporting to avoid blacklisting, and explain the emptying blacklist paradox. We recommend the harmonization of the standards to report suspicion of money laundering.
金融和法律实体（例如银行、赌场、公证人等）必须报告洗钱嫌疑。各国打击洗钱的参与度-除其他外-通过有关这些嫌疑报告频率的统计数据进行评估。不遵守规定可能导致经济上有害的黑名单。然而，这些黑名单一再变得空无一物-这就是所谓的“黑名单悖论”。我们建立了一个具有中间代理的委托代理模型，并表明非协调统计数据可能导致为避免列入黑名单而进行战略性报告，并解释了“黑名单悖论”。我们建议协调报告洗钱嫌疑的标准。
