Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, United States of America.
Department of Economics, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, United States of America.
PLoS One. 2021 Nov 2;16(11):e0259254. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0259254. eCollection 2021.
Despite recent emphasis and implementation of national and international anti-money laundering policies, illegal product markets, and their associated illicit profit remain a global problem. In addition to law enforcement aimed at reducing money-laundering, enforcement also takes place during (1) the production (e.g. crop eradication) and (2) sale (e.g. seizure of products during transportation that interrupts buyer and seller transactions) of the illegal product. Since funds for enforcement come from limited budgets, understanding where in this production-trade-laundering cycle law enforcement is most impactful becomes a global question. Using laboratory experimental markets and a seizure rate of 20%, we find that law enforcement focused on seizing laundered profits does little to reduce illegal market activity when compared to no law enforcement, suggesting that focusing law enforcement on money laundering will likely be ineffective at reducing crime. Results further show the amount of illicit trade is nearly 32% lower when law enforcement is focused at the point of sale, and there may be additional economic incentives that reduce illicit trade in the long run when compared to no law enforcement. Enforcement at the point of production also reduces market activity, but not as effectively as enforcement at the point of sale. Lastly, the empirical findings deviate from equilibrium predictions, suggesting law enforcement policy based on theory alone may lead to inefficient allocation of limited law enforcement resources.
尽管最近强调并实施了国家和国际反洗钱政策，但非法产品市场及其相关的非法利润仍然是一个全球性问题。除了旨在减少洗钱的执法行动外，在非法产品的（1）生产（例如作物铲除）和（2）销售（例如在运输过程中扣押产品，从而中断买卖双方的交易）阶段也会进行执法行动。由于执法资金来自有限的预算，因此了解在生产-贸易-洗钱周期的哪个环节执法最具影响力成为一个全球性问题。通过实验室实验市场和 20%的扣押率，我们发现，与没有执法行动相比，执法行动专注于扣押洗钱利润对减少非法市场活动几乎没有什么作用，这表明将执法重点放在洗钱上可能无法有效减少犯罪。研究结果进一步表明，当执法行动集中在销售点时，非法贸易的数量减少了近 32%，并且与没有执法行动相比，从长期来看，可能存在其他经济激励措施会减少非法贸易。在生产点进行执法也会减少市场活动，但不如在销售点进行执法有效。最后，实证结果与均衡预测存在偏差，这表明仅基于理论的执法政策可能导致有限执法资源的配置效率低下。
