Department of Psychology, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.
PLoS One. 2019 Aug 8;14(8):e0220886. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0220886. eCollection 2019.
The Mickey Mouse problem refers to the difficulty in predicting which supernatural agents are capable of eliciting belief and religious devotion. We approached the problem directly by asking participants to invent a "religious" or a "fictional" agent with five supernatural abilities. Compared to fictional agents, religious agents were ascribed a higher proportion of abilities that violated folk psychology or that were ambiguous-violating nonspecific or multiple domains of folk knowledge-and fewer abilities that violated folk physics and biology. Similarly, participants rated folk psychology violations provided by the experimenter as more characteristic of religious agents than were violations of folk physics or folk biology, while fictional agents showed no clear pattern. Religious agents were also judged as more potentially beneficial, and more ambivalent (i.e., similar ratings of benefit and harm), than fictional agents, regardless of whether the agents were invented or well-known to participants. Together, the results support a motivational account of religious belief formation that is facilitated by these biases.
米老鼠问题是指预测哪些超自然实体能够引起信仰和宗教虔诚的困难。我们通过要求参与者发明一个具有五种超自然能力的“宗教”或“虚构”实体来直接解决这个问题。与虚构的实体相比,宗教实体被赋予了更高比例的违反民间心理学或模糊违反非特定或多个民间知识领域的能力,而违反民间物理学和生物学的能力则较少。同样,参与者认为实验者提供的民间心理学违反更符合宗教实体的特征,而不是违反民间物理学或民间生物学,而虚构的实体则没有明显的模式。无论这些实体是参与者发明的还是已知的,宗教实体都被认为比虚构的实体更有潜在的好处,也更矛盾(即好处和危害的评价相似)。总之,这些结果支持了一种宗教信仰形成的动机解释,这种解释是由这些偏见促成的。