School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China.
School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China; School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100875, China.
Sci Total Environ. 2019 Dec 1;694:133559. doi: 10.1016/j.scitotenv.2019.07.365. Epub 2019 Jul 31.
This paper constructs a three-sided dynamic game model of the regional cooperative governance of haze pollution in China from a government heterogeneity perspective. By analysing the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium from game theory, this study explores the feasible mechanisms and the necessary conditions to establish a cooperative model, as well as effective ways for Superior Government to improve administrative efficiency. As evidenced in the results, due to the heterogeneity of governments and "free-riding" behaviours, a stable cooperative model cannot be spontaneously generated between two heterogeneous local governments, so the Superior Government is compelled to supervise the two parties and punish the non-cooperative ones. At the same time, the Superior Government can improve the efficiency of the supervision mechanism by increasing the penalty for non-cooperative parties and reducing the conflict cost when local governments are non-cooperative. The biggest innovation of this paper is to describe efficiency from the perspective of probability. The probability is calculated by the ratio of input to output. If the output-stable cooperation between local governments-is constant, then the less input-the cost of supervision, the higher the efficiency of the mechanism.
本文从政府异质性的角度构建了中国雾霾污染区域协同治理的三方动态博弈模型。通过博弈论的混合策略纳什均衡分析，探讨了建立合作模型的可行机制和必要条件，以及上级政府提高行政效率的有效途径。研究结果表明，由于政府之间的异质性和“搭便车”行为，两个异质的地方政府之间不能自发产生稳定的合作模型，因此上级政府必须对双方进行监督，并对不合作的一方进行惩罚。同时，上级政府可以通过增加对不合作方的惩罚和减少地方政府不合作时的冲突成本，提高监督机制的效率。本文的最大创新之处在于从概率的角度来描述效率。概率是通过投入与产出的比率来计算的。如果地方政府之间的输出——稳定合作——是恒定的，那么投入越少——监督成本越低，机制的效率就越高。
