Using three-sided dynamic game model to study regional cooperative governance of haze pollution in China from a government heterogeneity perspective.

This paper constructs a three-sided dynamic game model of the regional cooperative governance of haze pollution in China from a government heterogeneity perspective. By analysing the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium from game theory, this study explores the feasible mechanisms and the necessary conditions to establish a cooperative model, as well as effective ways for Superior Government to improve administrative efficiency. As evidenced in the results, due to the heterogeneity of governments and "free-riding" behaviours, a stable cooperative model cannot be spontaneously generated between two heterogeneous local governments, so the Superior Government is compelled to supervise the two parties and punish the non-cooperative ones. At the same time, the Superior Government can improve the efficiency of the supervision mechanism by increasing the penalty for non-cooperative parties and reducing the conflict cost when local governments are non-cooperative. The biggest innovation of this paper is to describe efficiency from the perspective of probability. The probability is calculated by the ratio of input to output. If the output-stable cooperation between local governments-is constant, then the less input-the cost of supervision, the higher the efficiency of the mechanism.