West Center for Economic Research, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, Sichuan, 611130, China.
School of Business Administration, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, Sichuan, 611130, China.
J Environ Manage. 2021 Nov 15;298:113499. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2021.113499. Epub 2021 Aug 9.
The pollution control of local government to industrial enterprises is actually a long-term, complex and dynamic game process. This study develops an evolutionary game model to analyze the operation mechanism of local governments' different expenditure preferences on the production behavior of industrial polluting enterprises, so as to specify the behavioral characteristics and optimal strategy of local environmental governance. The results indicated that whether the relationship between local governments and polluting enterprises in environmental governance becomes cooperative or collusive depends on their game sequence and initial endowment. Under the condition of realizing a steady state of cooperation, polluting enterprises would advance faster toward clean production if local governments distribute more environmental expenditures on cost subsidies for enterprises to implement clean production. The findings of this study provide decision-making basis for local governments to control industrial pollution.
地方政府对工业企业的污染控制实际上是一个长期、复杂且动态的博弈过程。本研究构建了一个演化博弈模型，以分析地方政府在工业污染企业生产行为上的不同支出偏好的运作机制，从而明确地方环境治理的行为特征和最优策略。结果表明，地方政府与污染企业在环境治理中的关系是合作还是勾结，取决于他们的博弈顺序和初始禀赋。在实现合作稳定状态的条件下，如果地方政府将更多的环境支出用于企业实施清洁生产的成本补贴，那么污染企业将更快地向清洁生产推进。本研究的发现为地方政府控制工业污染提供了决策依据。
