Bingham Jeremy, Landi Pietro, Hui Cang
Department of Mathematical Sciences, Stellenbosch University, Matieland 7602, South Africa.
African Institute for Mathematical Sciences, Cape Town 7945, South Africa.
Math Biosci Eng. 2019 May 9;16(5):4092-4106. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2019203.
The problem of cooperation remains one of the fundamental questions in the fields of biology, sociology, and economics. The emergence and maintenance of cooperation are naturally affected by group dynamics, since individuals are likely to behave differently based on shared group membership. We here formulate a model of socio-economic power between two prejudiced groups, and explore the conditions for their cooperative coexistence under two social scenarios in a well-mixed environment. Each scenario corresponds to an asymmetrical increase in the payoffs for mutual cooperation in either cross-group or within-group interactions. In the 'inter-dependence' scenario payoffs of cross-group cooperation are enhanced, while in the 'group-cohesion' scenario payoffs of within-group cooperation are enhanced. We find that stable cooperative coexistence is possible only in the inter-dependence scenario. The conditions for such coexistence are highly sensitive to prejudice, defined as the reduction in probability for cross-group cooperation, and less sensitive to privilege, defined as the enhancements to payoffs of cross-group cooperation.
合作问题仍然是生物学、社会学和经济学领域的基本问题之一。合作的出现和维持自然会受到群体动态的影响，因为个体可能会基于共同的群体成员身份而表现出不同的行为。我们在此构建了两个存在偏见的群体之间的社会经济权力模型，并在一个充分混合的环境中，探讨了两种社会情景下它们合作共存的条件。每种情景对应着跨群体或群体内部互动中相互合作收益的不对称增加。在“相互依赖”情景中，跨群体合作的收益得到增强，而在“群体凝聚力”情景中，群体内部合作的收益得到增强。我们发现，只有在相互依赖情景中才可能实现稳定的合作共存。这种共存的条件对偏见高度敏感，偏见被定义为跨群体合作概率的降低，而对特权的敏感度较低，特权被定义为跨群体合作收益的增强。
