Aarhus University, School of Business and Social Sciences: Department of Political Science, Aarhus, Denmark.
Bioethics. 2020 Mar;34(3):272-280. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12661. Epub 2019 Oct 10.
The wishes of registered organ donors are regularly set aside when family members object to donation. This genuine overruling of the wishes of the deceased raises difficult ethical questions. A successful argument for providing the family with a veto must (a) provide reason to disregard the wishes of the dead, and (b) establish why the family should be allowed to decide. One branch of justification seeks to reconcile the family veto with important ideas about respecting property rights, preserving autonomy, and preventing harm. These arguments are ultimately unsuccessful. Another branch of arguments is consequentialist, pointing out the negative consequences of removing the veto. Whether construed as concerning family distress or as a potential drop in the organs available, these arguments are unsuccessful; the first fails to recognize the tremendous distress associated with waiting for an organ, while the second has little supporting evidence. A final section considers and rejects whether combining some of the arguments just examined could justify the family veto. We should thus remove the family veto in organ donation.
当家庭成员反对捐赠时,注册器官捐赠者的意愿经常被搁置。这种对死者意愿的真正否决引发了一些棘手的伦理问题。为家属提供否决权的论点必须(a)提供无视死者意愿的理由,以及(b)确定为什么应该允许家属做出决定。一种正当理由的论证试图调和家庭否决权与尊重财产权、维护自主权和防止伤害的重要观念。这些论点最终都没有成功。另一种论点是后果主义的,指出取消否决权的负面影响。无论是将其解释为涉及家庭痛苦还是作为潜在的器官供应减少,这些论点都没有成功;第一个论点没有认识到等待器官所带来的巨大痛苦,而第二个论点几乎没有支持证据。最后一部分考虑并拒绝了是否可以将刚才审查的一些论点结合起来为家庭否决权辩护。因此,我们应该在器官捐赠中取消家庭否决权。