Psychological primitives can make sense of biopsychosocial factor complexity in psychopathology.

BACKGROUND

Many agree that the biopsychosocial contributions to psychopathology are complex, yet it is unclear how we can make sense of this complexity. One approach is to reduce this complexity to a few necessary and sufficient biopsychosocial factors; although this approach is easy to understand, it has little explanatory power. Another approach is to fully embrace complexity, proposing that each instance of psychopathology is caused by a partially unique set of biopsychosocial factors; this approach has high explanatory power, but is impossible to comprehend. Due to deficits in either explanatory power or comprehensibility, both approaches limit our ability to make substantial advances in understanding, predicting, and preventing psychopathology. Thus, how can we make sense of biopsychosocial factor complexity?

MAIN TEXT

There is a third possible approach that can resolve this dilemma, with high explanatory power and high comprehensibility. This approach involves understanding, predicting, and preventing psychopathology in terms of a small set of psychological primitives rather than biopsychosocial factors. Psychological primitives are the fundamental and irreducible elements of the mind, mediating all biopsychosocial factor influences on psychopathology. All psychological phenomena emerge from these primitives. Over the past decade, this approach has been successfully applied within basic psychological science, most notably affective science. It explains the sum of the evidence in affective science and has generated several novel research directions. This approach is equally applicable to psychopathology. The primitive-based approach does not eliminate the role of biopsychosocial factors, but rather recasts them as indeterminate causal influences on psychological primitives. In doing so, it reframes research away from factor-based questions (e.g., which situations cause suicide?) and toward primitive-based questions (e.g., how are suicidality concepts formed, altered, activated, and implemented?). This is a valuable shift because factor-based questions have indeterminate answers (e.g., infinite situations could cause suicide) whereas primitive-based questions have determinate answers (e.g., there are specific processes that undergird all concepts).

CONCLUSION

The primitive-based approach accounts for biopsychosocial complexity, ties clinical science more directly to basic psychological science, and could facilitate progress in understanding, predicting, and preventing psychopathology.