Institute of Management Science and Engineering, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004, China.
School of Business, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2019 Nov 18;16(22):4566. doi: 10.3390/ijerph16224566.
This paper constructs a dual-channel value chain composed of one altruistic manufacturer and one altruistic retailer, where the manufacturer makes green innovation input for green products and sells its green products to its customers through both the direct channel and the traditional channel, the retailer provides channel service for customers and sells green products through the traditional channel. We consider two scenarios in which the manufacturer and the retailer make decentralized and centralized decisions, respectively. We develop two dynamic game models for the two scenarios and analyze the dynamic behaviors of the two dynamic game models using bifurcation diagram, LLE (largest Lyapunov exponent) and attraction of basin, etc. We find that the stability region in decentralized decision model is greater than that of centralized decision, and narrow with increase of service value, green innovation input. In the decentralized decision model, the stability of the system decreases with the altruistic behavior increasing. With the price adjustment speed increasing, the dual-channel green value chain system enters into chaotic state through flip bifurcation or N-S bifurcation. In the stable state, the manufacturer and the retailer can obtain the maximum utility with the appropriate value of green innovation input. In the chaotic state, the utilities of the manufacturer and retailer are greatly affected and significantly reduced. This study will provide good guidance for sustainable development decision-making of dual-channel green value chain.
本文构建了一个由一个利他制造商和一个利他零售商组成的双渠道价值链，其中制造商为绿色产品进行绿色创新投入，并通过直接渠道和传统渠道将其绿色产品销售给客户，零售商为客户提供渠道服务，并通过传统渠道销售绿色产品。我们分别考虑了制造商和零售商进行分散和集中决策的两种情况。我们为两种情况开发了两个动态博弈模型，并使用分岔图、LLE（最大李雅普诺夫指数）和吸引盆地等方法分析了两个动态博弈模型的动态行为。我们发现，分散决策模型的稳定区域大于集中决策模型，随着服务价值、绿色创新投入的增加而变窄。在分散决策模型中，随着利他行为的增加，系统的稳定性降低。随着价格调整速度的增加，双渠道绿色价值链系统通过翻转分岔或 N-S 分岔进入混沌状态。在稳定状态下，制造商和零售商可以通过适当的绿色创新投入值获得最大效用。在混沌状态下，制造商和零售商的效用受到很大影响，显著降低。本研究将为双渠道绿色价值链的可持续发展决策提供良好的指导。
