Department of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology, Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
Industrial Engineering Group, Iran University of Payame Noor, Farmanieh, Tehran, Iran.
PLoS One. 2018 Apr 12;13(4):e0195109. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0195109. eCollection 2018.
This paper studies the Retailer Stackelberg game in a supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and one retailer where they compete simultaneously under three factors including price, service and simple price discount contract. It is assumed that the second manufacturer provides service directly to his customers, and the retailer provides service for the first product's customers, while the retailer buys the first product under price discount from the first manufacturer. The analysis of the optimal equilibrium solutions and the results of the numerical examples show that if a manufacturer chooses the appropriate range of discount rate, he will gain more profit than when there is no discount given to the retailer. This situation can be considered as an effective tool for the coordination of the first manufacturer and the retailer to offer discount by manufacturer and to provide the service by the retailer. We obtain equilibrium solution of Retailer Stackelberg game and analyze the numerical examples under two cases: a) the manufacturers sell their products to the retailer without price discount contract. b) The first manufacturer sells his products to the retailer with the simple price discount contract. The preliminary results show that the service and the price discount contract can improve the performance of supply chain.
本文研究了由两个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链中的零售商 Stackelberg 博弈，他们在价格、服务和简单价格折扣合同三个因素下同时竞争。假设第二家制造商直接向其客户提供服务，零售商为第一个产品的客户提供服务，而零售商从第一家制造商处购买价格折扣的第一个产品。最优均衡解的分析和数值实例的结果表明，如果制造商选择适当的折扣率范围，他将比没有向零售商提供折扣时获得更多的利润。这种情况可以被认为是协调制造商和零售商提供折扣和零售商提供服务的有效工具。我们在两种情况下得到了零售商 Stackelberg 博弈的均衡解，并对数值实例进行了分析：a）制造商没有价格折扣合同将产品卖给零售商。b）第一家制造商与零售商签订简单价格折扣合同销售其产品。初步结果表明，服务和价格折扣合同可以提高供应链的绩效。
