Philosophy, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215, USA
J Med Ethics. 2020 May;46(5):320-327. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2019-105847. Epub 2020 Feb 25.
While artificial womb technology (ectogenesis) is currently being studied for the purpose of improving neonatal care, I contend that this technology ought to be pursued as a means to address the unprecedented rate of unintended pregnancies. But ectogenesis, alongside other emerging reproductive technologies, is problematic insofar as it threatens to disrupt the natural link between procreation and parenthood that is normally thought to generate rights and responsibilities for biological parents. I argue that there remains only one potentially viable account of parenthood: the voluntarist account, which construes parental rights as robust moral obligations that must be voluntarily undertaken. The problem is that this account mistakenly presumes a patriarchal divide between procreation and parenthood. I propose a reframing of procreation and parenthood from a feminist perspective that recognises gestational motherhood as involving robust moral obligations that ought to be voluntarily undertaken. If this were the case, all gestational mothers would be, by definition, willing mothers. To make this happen I argue that ectogenesis technology must be a widely available reproductive option.
虽然人工子宫技术(体外生育)目前正被研究用于改善新生儿护理,但我认为这项技术应该被视为解决意外怀孕率前所未有之高的手段。但是,人工子宫技术与其他新兴生殖技术一样存在问题,因为它有可能破坏生育和父母身份之间的自然联系,而这种联系通常被认为是为生物父母产生权利和责任的基础。我认为,关于父母身份,仍然只有一种可能的可行解释:自愿主义解释,它将父母权利视为必须自愿承担的强有力的道德义务。问题是,这种解释错误地假设了生育和父母身份之间的父权制划分。我从女权主义的角度提出了一种重新定义生育和父母身份的方法,这种方法承认代孕母亲身份涉及必须自愿承担的强有力的道德义务。如果是这样的话,所有的代孕母亲都可以说是愿意生育的母亲。为了实现这一点,我认为人工子宫技术必须成为一种广泛可用的生殖选择。