Hubei Co-Innovation Center of Basic Education Information Technology Services, College of Computer, Hubei University of Education, Wuhan, China.
Key Laboratory of Aerospace Information Security and Trusted Computing, Ministry of Education, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China.
J Med Syst. 2020 Mar 18;44(5):92. doi: 10.1007/s10916-020-1527-7.
An electronic health (e-health) system, such as a medical cyber-physical system, offers a number of benefits (e.g. inform medical diagnosis). There are, however, a number of considerations in the implementation of the medical cyber-physical system, such as the integrity of medical / healthcare data (e.g. manipulated data can result in misdiagnosis). A number of digital signature schemes have been proposed in recent years to mitigate some of these challenges. However, the security of existing signatures is mostly based on conventional difficult mathematical problems, which are known to be insecure against quantum attacks. In this paper, we propose a certificateless signature scheme, based on NTRU lattice. The latter is based on the difficulty of small integer solutions on the NTRU lattice, and is known to be quantum attack resilience. Security analysis and performance evaluations demonstrate that our proposed scheme achieves significantly reduced communication and computation costs in comparison to two other competing quantum resilience schemes, while being quantum attack resilience.
电子健康(e-health)系统,如医疗网络物理系统,提供了许多好处(例如,辅助医疗诊断)。然而,在医疗网络物理系统的实施中存在许多需要考虑的因素,例如医疗/医疗保健数据的完整性(例如,操纵数据可能导致误诊)。近年来已经提出了许多数字签名方案来缓解其中的一些挑战。然而,现有签名的安全性主要基于传统的困难数学问题,这些问题已知对量子攻击不安全。在本文中,我们提出了一种基于 NTRU 格的无证书签名方案。后者基于 NTRU 格上小整数解的难度,并且已知具有量子攻击弹性。安全分析和性能评估表明,与另外两个具有竞争优势的量子弹性方案相比,我们提出的方案在通信和计算成本方面有显著降低,同时具有量子攻击弹性。