Gallup Gordon G
Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Albany.
Am J Primatol. 1982;2(3):237-248. doi: 10.1002/ajp.1350020302.
To date humans, chimpanzees, and orangutans are the only species which have been shown capable of recognizing themselves in mirrors. Several species of macaques have now been provided with years of continuous exposure to mirrors, but they still persist in reacting to their reflection as if they were seeing other monkeys. Even gibbons (apes) and gorillas (great apes) seem incapable of learning that their behavior is the source of the behavior depicted in the image. Most primates, therefore, appear to lack a cognitive category for processing mirrored information about themselves. The implications of these data for traditional views of consciousness are considered briefly, and a recent attempt to develop an operant analog to self-recognition is critically evaluated. Finally, an attempt is made to show that self-awareness, consciousness, and mind are not mutually exclusive cognitive categories and that the emergence of self-awareness may be equivalent to the emergence of mind. Several indices of "mind" which can be applied to nonhuman species are discussed in the context of an attempt to develop a comparative psychology of mind.
迄今为止，人类、黑猩猩和猩猩是仅有的被证明能够在镜子中认出自己的物种。现在，几种猕猴已经持续多年接触镜子，但它们仍然像看到其他猴子一样对自己的倒影做出反应。甚至长臂猿（猿类）和大猩猩（大型猿类）似乎也无法认识到它们的行为是镜子中所呈现行为的来源。因此，大多数灵长类动物似乎缺乏处理关于自身镜像信息的认知范畴。简要考虑了这些数据对传统意识观点的影响，并对最近开发一种操作性自我识别类似物的尝试进行了批判性评估。最后，试图表明自我意识、意识和心智并非相互排斥的认知范畴，而且自我意识的出现可能等同于心智的出现。在尝试发展一种心智比较心理学的背景下，讨论了几种可应用于非人类物种的“心智”指标。
