Department of Philosophy, University of São Paulo, São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil
J Med Ethics. 2020 Jun;46(6):405-411. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2019-105915. Epub 2020 Mar 30.
A new argument has been made against moral enhancement by authors who are otherwise in favour of human enhancement. Additionally, they share the same evolutionary toolkit for analysing human traits as well as the belief that our current morality is unfit to deal with modern problems, such as climate change and nuclear proliferation. The argument is put forward by Buchanan and Powell and states that other paths to moral progress are enough to deal with these problems. Given the likely costs and risks involved with developing moral enhancement, this argument implies moral enhancement is an unpromising enterprise. After mentioning proposed solutions to such modern problems, I will argue that moral enhancement would help implement any of them. I will then detail Buchanan and Powell's new argument disfavouring moral enhancement and argue that it makes too bold assumptions about the efficacy of traditional moral progress. For instance, it overlooks how that progress was to achieve even in relatively successful cases such as the abolition of slavery. Traditional moral progress is likely to require assistance from non-traditional means in order to face new challenges.
有新的论点反对道德增强，其作者原本是支持人类增强的。此外，他们在分析人类特征时使用了相同的进化工具包，并且相信我们目前的道德不适合处理现代问题，如气候变化和核扩散。这一论点是由布坎南和鲍威尔提出的，他们认为其他通向道德进步的途径足以应对这些问题。考虑到开发道德增强可能涉及的成本和风险，这一论点意味着道德增强是一项没有前途的事业。在提到解决这些现代问题的建议方案后，我将论证道德增强将有助于实施其中任何一项方案。然后，我将详细阐述布坎南和鲍威尔反对道德增强的新论点，并论证该论点对传统道德进步的效果做出了过于大胆的假设。例如，它忽略了即使在废除奴隶制等相对成功的案例中，这一进步是如何实现的。为了应对新的挑战，传统的道德进步可能需要借助非传统手段的帮助。
