Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK.
Bard College Berlin, Platanenstraße 24, 13156, Berlin, Germany.
Nat Commun. 2020 Apr 14;11(1):1815. doi: 10.1038/s41467-020-15661-7.
We use a laboratory version of the intergenerational goods game (IGG) to investigate whether peer punishment facilitates the successful provision of multigenerational public goods. In our experiment, groups (generations) decide sequentially about the provision of a multigenerational public good through the voluntary contributions of their members. Successful provision requires that contributions meet a threshold and exclusively benefits members of future generations. Provision costs are borne only by the current generation. We compare a baseline condition without a punishment institution to a treatment condition where peer punishment can be inflicted exclusively on members of the same generation but not on members of past or future generations. We find that without punishment the likelihood of reaching the contribution threshold is low and that making punishment available within a generation is partially successful in sustaining cooperation in a succession of multiple generations.
我们使用代际物品游戏（IGG）的实验室版本来研究同伴惩罚是否有助于成功提供多代公共物品。在我们的实验中，群体（代）通过成员的自愿贡献依次决定多代公共物品的提供。成功的提供需要贡献达到一个阈值，并且只惠及后代成员。提供成本仅由当前一代承担。我们将没有惩罚制度的基准条件与一种处理条件进行比较，在这种处理条件下，同伴惩罚只能施加于同一代的成员，而不能施加于过去或未来的成员。我们发现，没有惩罚，达到贡献阈值的可能性很低，而在一代内提供惩罚在一定程度上成功地维持了多代连续的合作。
