Perelman School of Medicine, Division of Pulmonary, Allergy, and Critical Care, Department of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
Perelman School of Medicine, Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
JAMA Netw Open. 2020 May 1;3(5):e204439. doi: 10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.4439.
The incentive structure of accountable care organizations (ACOs) may lead to participating physician groups selecting fewer vulnerable patients.
To test for changes in the percentage of racial minority patients and patients with low socioeconomic status cared for by physician groups after joining the ACO.
DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: This retrospective cohort consisted of a 15% random sample of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries attributed to physician groups from 2010 to 2016. Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) participation was determined using ACO files. Analyses were conducted between January 1, 2019, and February 25, 2020.
Using linear probability models, we conducted difference-in-differences analyses based on the year a physician group joined an ACO to estimate changes in vulnerable patients within ACO-participating groups compared with nonparticipating groups.
Whether the patient was black, was dually enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid, and poverty and unemployment rates of the patient's zip code.
In a cohort of 76 717 physician groups caring for 7 307 130 patients, 16.1% of groups caring for 27.8% of patients participated in an MSSP ACO. Using 2010 characteristics, patients attributed to ACOs from 2012 to 2016, compared with those who were not, were less likely to be black (8.0% [n = 81 698] vs 9.3% [n = 270 924]) or dually enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid (12.8% [n = 130 957] vs 18.2% [n = 528 685]), and lived in zip codes with lower poverty rates (13.8% vs 15.5%); unemployment rates were similar (8.0% vs 8.5%). In the difference-in-differences analysis, there was no statistically significant change associated with ACO participation in the proportions of vulnerable patients attributed to ACO-participating groups compared with nonparticipating groups. After joining an ACO, ACO-participating groups had 0.0 percentage points change (95% CI, -0.1 to 0.1 percentage points; P = .59) for black patients, -0.1 percentage points (95% CI, -0.2 to 0.1 percentage points; P = .32) for patients dually enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid, 0.2 percentage points (95% CI, -3.5 to 4.0 percentage points; P = .91) in poverty rates, and -0.4 percentage points (95% CI, -2.0 to 1.2 percentage points; P = .62) in unemployment rates.
In this cohort study, there were no changes in the proportions of vulnerable patients cared for by ACO-participating physician groups after joining an ACO compared with changes among nonparticipating groups.
问责制医疗组织(ACO)的激励结构可能导致参与的医师组选择较少的弱势患者。
测试加入 ACO 后,医师组所照顾的少数族裔患者和社会经济地位较低的患者的比例变化。
设计、环境和参与者:这是一项回顾性队列研究,由 2010 年至 2016 年归因于医师组的 Medicare 按服务收费受益人的 15%随机样本组成。使用 ACO 文件确定 Medicare 共享储蓄计划(MSSP)的参与情况。分析于 2019 年 1 月 1 日至 2020 年 2 月 25 日之间进行。
我们使用线性概率模型,根据医师组加入 ACO 的年份进行差分分析,以估计与未参与组相比,参与 ACO 的医师组内弱势患者的变化。
患者是否为黑人、是否同时参加医疗保险和医疗补助、以及患者邮政编码的贫困率和失业率。
在一个由 76717 个医师组照顾 7307130 名患者的队列中,有 16.1%的医师组参与了 MSSP ACO,照顾了 27.8%的患者。使用 2010 年的特征,与未参与 MSSP ACO 的患者相比,2012 年至 2016 年被归入 ACO 的患者不太可能是黑人(8.0%[n=81698]与 9.3%[n=270924])或同时参加医疗保险和医疗补助(12.8%[n=130957]与 18.2%[n=528685]),而且居住在贫困率较低的邮政编码中(13.8%与 15.5%);失业率相似(8.0%与 8.5%)。在差异分析中,与 ACO 参与相比,ACO 参与组与非参与组之间弱势患者的比例没有统计学上的显著变化。加入 ACO 后,ACO 参与组的黑人患者比例变化为 0.0 个百分点(95%CI,-0.1 至 0.1 个百分点;P=0.59),同时参加医疗保险和医疗补助的患者比例变化为-0.1 个百分点(95%CI,-0.2 至 0.1 个百分点;P=0.32),贫困率变化为 0.2 个百分点(95%CI,-3.5 至 4.0 个百分点;P=0.91),失业率变化为-0.4 个百分点(95%CI,-2.0 至 1.2 个百分点;P=0.62)。
在这项队列研究中,与非参与组相比,加入 ACO 后,参与 ACO 的医师组所照顾的弱势患者比例没有变化。