Duke University, Kenan Institute for Ethics, Campus Box 90432, Durham, NC 27708, USA.
Life University, 1269 Barclay Circle, Marietta, GA 30060, USA.
Cognition. 2020 Oct;203:104342. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104342. Epub 2020 Jun 25.
A key source of support for the view that challenging people's beliefs about free will may undermine moral behavior is two classic studies by Vohs and Schooler (2008). These authors reported that exposure to certain prompts suggesting that free will is an illusion increased cheating behavior. In the present paper, we report several attempts to replicate this influential and widely cited work. Over a series of five studies (sample sizes of N = 162, N = 283, N = 268, N = 804, N = 982) (four preregistered) we tested the relationship between (1) anti-free-will prompts and free will beliefs and (2) free will beliefs and immoral behavior. Our primary task was to closely replicate the findings from Vohs and Schooler (2008) using the same or highly similar manipulations and measurements as the ones used in their original studies. Our efforts were largely unsuccessful. We suggest that manipulating free will beliefs in a robust way is more difficult than has been implied by prior work, and that the proposed link with immoral behavior may not be as consistent as previous work suggests.
支持这样一种观点的一个重要依据是,挑战人们对自由意志的信念可能会破坏道德行为,这一观点源于沃斯(Vohs)和肖勒(Schooler)的两项经典研究(2008)。这两位作者报告说,接触某些暗示自由意志是一种幻觉的提示会增加欺骗行为。在本文中,我们报告了几次尝试来复制这项有影响力且被广泛引用的工作。在五项研究中(样本量分别为 N=162、N=283、N=268、N=804、N=982)(其中四项预先注册),我们测试了(1)反自由意志提示与自由意志信念之间的关系,以及(2)自由意志信念与不道德行为之间的关系。我们的主要任务是使用与原始研究中相同或高度相似的操纵和测量方法,对沃斯和肖勒(2008)的研究结果进行严格复制。我们的努力在很大程度上并不成功。我们认为,以强有力的方式操纵自由意志信念比之前的研究所暗示的要困难得多,而且与不道德行为的拟议联系可能不如之前的研究所表明的那样一致。