Information & Computing Lab, AttlanTTIC Research Center, University of Vigo, 36310 Vigo, Spain.
Sensors (Basel). 2020 Jul 17;20(14):3977. doi: 10.3390/s20143977.
Smart meters are of the basic elements in the so-called Smart Grid. These devices, connected to the Internet, keep bidirectional communication with other devices in the Smart Grid structure to allow remote readings and maintenance. As any other device connected to a network, smart meters become vulnerable to attacks with different purposes, like stealing data or altering readings. Nowadays, it is becoming more and more popular to buy and plug-and-play smart meters, additionally to those installed by the energy providers, to directly monitor the energy consumption at home. This option inherently entails security risks that are under the responsibility of householders. In this paper, we focus on an open solution based on Smartpi 2.0 devices with two purposes. On the one hand, we propose a network configuration and different data flows to exchange data (energy readings) in the home. These flows are designed to support collaborative among the devices in order to prevent external attacks and attempts of corrupting the data. On the other hand, we check the vulnerability by performing two kind of attacks (denial of service and stealing and changing data by using a malware). We conclude that, as expected, these devices are vulnerable to these attacks, but we provide mechanisms to detect both of them and to solve, by applying cooperation techniques.
智能电表是所谓智能电网的基本要素。这些设备通过互联网与智能电网结构中的其他设备保持双向通信,以实现远程读数和维护。与连接到网络的任何其他设备一样,智能电表容易受到各种目的的攻击,例如窃取数据或篡改读数。如今,越来越多的人选择购买并即插即用的智能电表,以替代能源供应商安装的电表,直接在家中监控能源消耗。这种选择内在地带来了安全风险,应由房主负责。在本文中,我们专注于基于 Smartpi 2.0 设备的开放解决方案,该解决方案有两个目的。一方面,我们提出了一种网络配置和不同的数据流程,以在家庭中交换数据(能源读数)。这些流程旨在支持设备之间的协作,以防止外部攻击和篡改数据的企图。另一方面,我们通过执行两种类型的攻击(拒绝服务和使用恶意软件窃取和更改数据)来检查漏洞。我们的结论是,这些设备容易受到这些攻击,正如预期的那样,但我们提供了检测它们的机制,并通过应用协作技术来解决它们。