Mullins Brandon T, Mazur Lukasz, Dance Michael, McGurk Ross, Schreiber Eric, Marks Lawrence B, Shen Colette J, Lawrence Michael V, Chera Bhishamjit S
Department of Radiation Oncology, University of North Carolina Hospitals, Chapel Hill, NC, United States.
Division of Healthcare Engineering, Department of Radiation Oncology, University of North Carolina School of Medicine, Chapel Hill, NC, United States.
Front Oncol. 2020 Jul 8;10:1077. doi: 10.3389/fonc.2020.01077. eCollection 2020.
Stereotactic radiosurgery (SRS) and stereotactic body radiation therapy (SBRT) may be considered "high risk" due to the high doses per fraction. We analyzed CyberKnife™ (CK) SRS and SBRT-related incidents that were prospectively reported to our in-house incident learning system (ILS) in order to identify severity, contributing factors, and common error pathways. From 2012 to 2019, 221 reported incidents related to the 4,569 CK fractions delivered (5.8%) were prospectively analyzed by our multi-professional Quality and Safety Committee with regard to severity, contributing factors, as well as the location where the incident occurred (), where it was discovered (), and the safety barriers that were traversed on the CK process map. Based on the particular step in the process map that incidents , we categorized incidents into general error pathways. There were 205 severity grade 1-2 (did not reach patient or no clinical impact), 11 grade 3 (clinical impact unlikely), 5 grade 4 (altered the intended treatment), and 0 grade 5-6 (life-threatening or death) incidents, with human performance being the most common contributing factor (79% of incidents). Incidents most commonly near the time when the practitioner requested CK simulation (e.g., pre-CK simulation fiducial marker placement) and most commonly during the physics pre-treatment checklist. The four general error pathways included pre-authorization, billing, and scheduling issues (= 119); plan quality (= 30); administration of IV contrast during simulation or pre-medications during treatment (= 22); and image guidance (= 12). Most CK incidents led to little or no patient harm and most were related to billing and scheduling issues. Suboptimal human performance appeared to be the most common contributing factor to CK incidents. Additional study is warranted to develop and share best practices to reduce incidents to further improve patient safety.
由于每次分割剂量较高,立体定向放射外科(SRS)和立体定向体部放射治疗(SBRT)可能被视为“高风险”。我们分析了前瞻性报告至我们内部事件学习系统(ILS)的赛博刀(CyberKnife™,CK)SRS和SBRT相关事件,以确定严重程度、促成因素和常见错误路径。2012年至2019年期间,我们的多专业质量与安全委员会对前瞻性报告的221起与所交付的4569个CK分割剂量相关的事件(5.8%)进行了分析,涉及严重程度、促成因素以及事件发生的位置()、发现的位置(),以及在CK流程地图上跨越的安全屏障。根据事件在流程地图中的特定步骤,我们将事件归类为一般错误路径。有205起严重程度为1 - 2级(未影响患者或无临床影响)、11起3级(临床影响可能性不大)、5起4级(改变了预期治疗)以及0起5 - 6级(危及生命或死亡)事件,人为因素是最常见的促成因素(占事件的79%)。事件最常发生在从业者要求进行CK模拟时(例如,CK模拟前放置基准标记),且最常发生在物理预处理检查清单期间。四个一般错误路径包括预授权、计费和调度问题(= 119);计划质量(= 30);模拟期间静脉注射造影剂或治疗期间的预处理药物(= 22);以及图像引导(= 12)。大多数CK事件对患者造成的伤害很小或没有伤害,且大多数与计费和调度问题有关。人为表现欠佳似乎是CK事件最常见的促成因素。有必要进行进一步研究以制定和分享最佳实践,以减少事件发生,从而进一步提高患者安全。