Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom; John Radcliffe Hospital, Oxford, United Kingdom; and Murdoch Children's Research Institute, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
Pediatrics. 2020 Aug;146(Suppl 1):S54-S59. doi: 10.1542/peds.2020-0818K.
In 2017, the court case over medical treatment of UK infant, Charlie Gard, reached global attention. In this article, I will analyze one of the more distinctive elements of the case. The UK courts concluded that treatment of Charlie Gard was not in his best interests and that it would be permissible to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. However, in addition, the court ruled that Charlie should not be transferred overseas for the treatment that his parents sought, even though specialists in Italy and the US were willing to provide that treatment. Is it ethical to prevent parents from pursuing life-prolonging treatment overseas for their children? If so, when is it ethical to do this? I will outline arguments in defense of obstructing transfer in some situations. I will argue, however, that this is only justified if there is good reason to think that the proposed treatment would cause harm.
2017 年,英国婴儿查理·加德(Charlie Gard)的医疗官司引起了全球关注。在本文中,我将分析该案的一个较为独特的要素。英国法院的结论是,查理·加德的治疗不符合他的最佳利益,允许停止维持生命的治疗。然而,除此之外,法院还裁定,即使意大利和美国的专家愿意提供这种治疗,也不应将查理转移到海外接受其父母寻求的治疗。家长是否应该为孩子在海外寻求延长生命的治疗而被阻止?如果是这样,在什么情况下这样做是合乎道德的?我将概述支持在某些情况下阻止转移的论点。然而,我认为,只有有充分的理由认为拟议的治疗会造成伤害,这种做法才是合理的。