L. and A. Birkenmajer Institute for the History of Science of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2020 Aug;82:44-56. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2019.12.002. Epub 2019 Dec 12.
This paper investigates the functioning of the 'Copernican paradox' (stating that the Sun stands still and the Earth revolves around the Sun) in the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England, with particular attention to Edward Gresham's (1565-1613) little-known and hitherto understudied astronomical treatise - Astrostereon, or A Discourse of the Falling of the Planet (1603). The text, which is fully appreciative of the heliocentric system, is analysed within a broader context of the ongoing struggles with the Copernican theory at the turn of the seventeenth century. The article finds that apart from having a purely rhetorical function, the 'Copernican paradox' featured in the epistemological debates on how early modern scientific knowledge should be constructed and popularised. The introduction of new scientific claims to sceptical audiences had to be done both through mathematical demonstrations and by referring to the familiar concepts and tools drawn from the inventory of humanist education. As this article shows, Gresham's rhetorical techniques used for the rejection of paradoxicality of heliocentrism are similar to some of the practices which Thomas Digges and William Gilbert employed in order to defend their own findings and assertions.
本文探讨了“哥白尼悖论”(即太阳静止不动,地球绕太阳旋转)在 16 世纪末至 17 世纪初英国的作用,特别关注了爱德华·格雷沙姆(Edward Gresham,1565-1613 年)鲜为人知且迄今研究不足的天文学论文——《天文镜》(Astrostereon,或《论行星坠落》,1603 年)。本文全面赞赏日心说体系,在 17 世纪之交与哥白尼理论持续斗争的更广泛背景下进行分析。本文发现,除了具有纯粹的修辞功能外,“哥白尼悖论”还出现在关于如何构建和普及早期现代科学知识的认识论辩论中。向持怀疑态度的受众介绍新的科学主张,不仅要通过数学论证,还要参考从人文教育库存中提取的熟悉概念和工具。正如本文所示,格雷沙姆用于拒绝日心说悖论的修辞技巧与托马斯·迪格斯(Thomas Digges)和威廉·吉尔伯特(William Gilbert)为捍卫自己的发现和主张而采用的一些做法相似。