Dept. of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, 15260, United States.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2020 Aug;82:9-16. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2019.08.002. Epub 2019 Aug 23.
John Norton's The Material Theory of Induction bristles with fresh insights and provocative ideas that provide a much needed stimulus to a stodgy if not moribund field. I use quantum mechanics (QM) as a medium for exploring some of these ideas. First, I note that QM offers more predictability than Newtonian mechanics for the Norton dome and other cases where classical determinism falters. But this ability of QM to partially cure the ills of classical determinism depends on facts about the quantum Hamiltonian operator that vary from case to case, providing an illustration of Norton's theme of the importance of contingent facts for inductive reasoning. Second, I agree with Norton that Bayesianism as developed for classical probability theory does not constitute a universal inference machine, and I use QM to explain the sense in which this is so. But at the same time I defend a brand of quantum Bayesianism as providing an illuminating account of how physicists' reasoning about quantum events. Third, I argue that if the probabilities induced by quantum states are regarded as objective chances then there are strong reasons to think that fair infinite lotteries are impossible in a quantum world.
约翰·诺顿的《归纳的物质理论》充满了新的见解和富有挑衅性的观点,为一个沉闷甚至垂死的领域提供了急需的刺激。我使用量子力学(QM)作为探索其中一些思想的媒介。首先,我注意到 QM 为 Norton 穹顶和其他经典决定论失败的情况提供了比牛顿力学更多的可预测性。但是,QM 部分治愈经典决定论弊病的这种能力取决于量子哈密顿算子的事实,这些事实因情况而异,为诺顿的主题提供了一个例证,即偶然事实对归纳推理的重要性。其次,我同意诺顿的观点,即针对经典概率论发展的贝叶斯主义并不构成通用推理机,我使用 QM 来解释这一点。但与此同时,我为一种量子贝叶斯主义辩护,认为它为物理学家对量子事件的推理提供了一个富有启发性的解释。第三,我认为,如果量子态诱导的概率被视为客观机会,那么就有充分的理由认为在量子世界中公平的无限彩票是不可能的。