Information and Society Research Division, National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, Japan.
School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan.
PLoS One. 2020 Aug 27;15(8):e0237862. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0237862. eCollection 2020.
As passive investment through index funds and Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) has become pervasive, the structure of corporate control in the global capital market is more complex than before. We propose a new model and calculation algorithm to measure a shareholder's power to control corporations in the global economy. Our method takes into account how fragmented voting rights attached to dispersed ownership may be consolidated to generate corporate control. Analyzing the ownership holdings in 49 million companies worldwide by 69 million shareholders in 2016, we find that the landscape of global corporate control appears differently if we adequately evaluate indirect influence via dispersed ownership. In particular, a larger portion of corporate control appears to be concentrated in the hands of sovereign governments than has been recognized before. Yet, such governmental capacities are "hidden" if we use the conventional method. Moreover, financial institutions appear to not be as powerful as emphasized before. These results point to important financial and political risks both for scholars and policymakers.
随着被动投资通过指数基金和交易所交易基金（ETF）变得普遍，全球资本市场的公司控制权结构比以往更加复杂。我们提出了一种新的模型和计算算法，以衡量股东在全球经济中控制公司的权力。我们的方法考虑了如何整合分散所有权所附带的零碎投票权，以产生公司控制权。通过分析 2016 年全球 4900 万家公司的所有权和 6900 万股东的所有权，我们发现，如果我们充分评估通过分散所有权产生的间接影响，全球公司控制权的格局就会有所不同。特别是，如果我们使用传统方法，那么更多的公司控制权似乎集中在主权政府手中。然而，如果使用传统方法，这些能力就“隐藏”了。此外，金融机构的影响力似乎不如以前强调的那么大。这些结果对学者和政策制定者都指出了重要的金融和政治风险。
