National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, Japan.
Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan.
PLoS One. 2021 Aug 12;16(8):e0256160. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0256160. eCollection 2021.
We analyze the connectivity of equity investments to the firms in the global ownership network that are reported as non-compliant with Environment, Social, and Government (ESG) benchmarks. We find that a large number of shareholders have ownership linkages to non-ESG firms, most commonly with three or four degrees of separation. Analyzing the betweenness centrality for shareholders connecting the ultimate owners and non-ESG firms, we find that the investment management companies play important roles in channeling the investment money into non-ESG firms, where largest American asset managers commonly have one to two degrees of separation on their ownership linkages to those problematic firms. Since asset managers collect capital from investors by running the equity funds, we analyze the ownership stakes and the associated voting rights attributable to the equity funds investors. We estimate the distribution of the power of corporate control over non-ESG firms among specific asset managers (such as BlackRock and Fidelity) and among different types of the equity funds (such as mutual funds and exchanged-traded funds), and explores how investing in the equity funds rather than ownership investing may have shifted the distribution of the power to control those non-ESG firms.
我们分析了在全球所有权网络中,那些被报告不符合环境、社会和政府(ESG)基准的公司的股权投资的连通性。我们发现,大量股东与非 ESG 公司有所有权联系,最常见的是有三到四个级别的分离。通过分析将最终所有者与非 ESG 公司联系起来的股东的中间中心性,我们发现投资管理公司在将投资资金输送到非 ESG 公司方面发挥了重要作用,其中最大的美国资产管理公司在其与这些有问题的公司的所有权联系上通常只有一到两个级别的分离。由于资产管理公司通过管理股权基金从投资者那里筹集资金,我们分析了股权基金投资者的所有权权益和相关投票权。我们估计了特定资产管理公司(如 BlackRock 和 Fidelity)和不同类型的股权基金(如共同基金和交易所交易基金)对非 ESG 公司的控制权的权力分布,并探讨了投资股权基金而不是所有权投资如何可能改变了对这些非 ESG 公司的控制权的分配。