Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA.
Department of Legal Studies & Business Ethics, The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA.
Nat Hum Behav. 2020 Dec;4(12):1258-1264. doi: 10.1038/s41562-020-00943-3. Epub 2020 Sep 7.
It has long been known that advocating for a cause can alter the advocate's beliefs. Yet a guiding assumption of many advocates is that the biasing effect of advocacy is controllable. Lawyers, for instance, are taught that they can retain unbiased beliefs while advocating for their clients and that they must do so to secure just outcomes. Across ten experiments (six preregistered; N = 3,104) we show that the biasing effect of advocacy is not controllable but automatic. Merely incentivizing people to advocate altered a range of beliefs about character, guilt and punishment. This bias appeared even in beliefs that are highly stable, when people were financially incentivized to form true beliefs and among professional lawyers, who are trained to prevent advocacy from biasing their judgements.
长期以来,人们一直认为,倡导某项事业可以改变倡导者的信念。然而,许多倡导者的一个指导假设是,倡导的偏见效应是可控的。例如,律师们被教导说,他们可以在为客户辩护的同时保留公正的信念,而且他们必须这样做才能确保公正的结果。在十项实验中(六项预先注册;N=3104),我们表明,倡导的偏见效应是不可控的,而是自动的。仅仅是激励人们去倡导就改变了一系列关于性格、内疚和惩罚的信念。即使是在那些非常稳定的信念中,当人们因形成真实的信念而受到经济激励时,这种偏见也会出现,而且在受过训练以防止倡导偏见影响他们判断的专业律师中也是如此。