Jalles João Tovar
Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão (ISEG), Universidade de Lisboa, Rua do Quelhas 6, 1200-781 Lisbon, Portugal.
Research in Economics and Mathematics (REM) and Research Unit on Complexity and Economics (UECE), ISEG, Universidade de Lisboa, Rua Miguel Lupi 20, 1249-078 Lisbon, Portugal.
Comp Econ Stud. 2021;63(1):84-116. doi: 10.1057/s41294-020-00135-y. Epub 2020 Aug 31.
This paper analyzes the political economy causes of fiscal promise gaps, defined as the distance between planned fiscal objectives and actual realizations during planned fiscal expansions periods. Using a sample of 27 European Union countries between 1992 and 2015, we identify, by means of an "hybrid" narrative approach, 68 episodes of promised fiscal expansions. We show that expansionary promise gaps were sizeable (about 1.5-2.5% of GDP during an average fiscal expansion episode) and that initial and economic conditions matter in explaining their size. We also find that the more leftist a government is, the larger the expansionary promise gap. Governments facing weak opposition in the parliament and those more effective are characterized by smaller expansionary promise gaps. Regarding the importance of decentralization and the role played by subnational governments, the larger their capacity to influence national legislation and policy, the larger the promise gaps.
本文分析了财政承诺差距的政治经济成因，财政承诺差距定义为在计划财政扩张期内计划财政目标与实际实现情况之间的差距。我们以1992年至2015年间27个欧盟国家为样本，通过一种“混合”叙述方法，识别出68个承诺财政扩张的事件。我们发现，扩张性承诺差距相当大（在平均一次财政扩张事件中约占国内生产总值的1.5%-2.5%），而且初始条件和经济状况对解释其规模很重要。我们还发现，政府越偏左，扩张性承诺差距就越大。在议会中面临较弱反对力量的政府以及效率更高的政府，其扩张性承诺差距较小。关于分权的重要性以及地方政府所起的作用，地方政府影响国家立法和政策的能力越大，承诺差距就越大。
