Heled Yaniv, Rutschman Ana Santos, Vertinsky Liza
Associate Professor, Georgia State University College of Law; Center for Law Health & Society and Center for Intellectual Property; J.S.D. 2011, LL.M. 2004 Columbia Law School; LL.B. 2000, Undergraduate Diploma in Biology 2000 Tel Aviv University.
Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, Center for Health Law Studies and Center for Comparative and International Law. S.J.D., LL.M., Duke Law School.
J Law Biosci. 2020 Aug 6;7(1):lsaa060. doi: 10.1093/jlb/lsaa060. eCollection 2020 Jan-Jun.
In this article, we explain why profit-driven models for developing treatments for epidemic pathogens produce sub-optimal and sometimes negative public health outcomes. Using the example of the drug remdesivir, we demonstrate how the divergence of private incentives from public health needs has led to such outcomes during the COVID-19 pandemic. We conclude that policy responses to this and future pandemics ought to be conceived and designed in ways that narrow the divergence of private interests from public health needs, including through greater public-sector involvement in pharmaceutical R&D.
在本文中，我们解释了为何以盈利为驱动的流行病病原体治疗研发模式会产生次优甚至有时是负面的公共卫生结果。以瑞德西韦药物为例，我们展示了在新冠疫情期间，私人利益与公共卫生需求的背离是如何导致此类结果的。我们得出结论，应对此次及未来大流行的政策措施应以缩小私人利益与公共卫生需求的背离为目标来构思和设计，包括通过公共部门更多地参与制药研发。
